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People appear to be biased in their pre-
dictions of the future; predicting that
projects will take less time than they actu-
ally will (see Roy et al., 2005a; Buehler
et al., 2010; Halkjelsvik and Jørgensen,
2012, for review) and that they will be
unlikely to experience future misfortunes
(see Dunning et al., 2004, for review).
These biases are frequently attributed to
people being overly optimistic (Armor
and Taylor, 1998, 2002; Dunning et al.,
2004). However, research indicates that
many of these seemingly motivated biases
could actually be due to task characteristics
or other non-motivational causes (Juslin
et al., 2000; Chambers and Windschitl,
2004; Roy et al., 2005a). Here I review
research, focusing on my own work
on time estimation and self-assessment,
which indicates that these seemingly opti-
mistic biases might often have other non-
motivational causes. Further, I discuss why
a belief that people are overly optimistic
might be problematic.
OPTIMISM IN TIME ESTIMATION?
The tendency for people to think that they
will finish tasks earlier than they actu-
ally will is frequently thought of as fitting
into a larger category of optimistic biases
(Armor and Taylor, 1998, 2002). It has
been proposed that underestimation is due
to people forming an optimistic scenario
of how a task will be completed and ignor-
ing memory for how long similar tasks
have taken in the past (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1982; Buehler et al., 2002).
However, underestimation of future
task duration might not be due to opti-
mism about the future, but instead be
due to biased memories of the past (Roy
et al., 2005a; see also Griffin and Buehler,
2005; Roy et al., 2005b). Similarly, it has
been proposed that it is the quality of peo-
ple’s episodic (Szpunar et al., 2013) and
semantic (Irish and Piguet, 2013) mem-
ories that predict their ability to envision
the future (Schacter et al., 2008; Szpunar
and McDermott, 2008). In support of the
view that biased predictions are caused
by biased memories, research indicates
that factors that influence memories of
past task duration have parallel influences
on predictions of future task duration
(Roy and Christenfeld, 2007, 2008) with
biased memories frequently associated
with biased predictions (Thomas et al.,
2004, 2007). Furthermore, correcting
memory for past task duration is one of
the only interventions that has been found
to successfully reduce bias and improve
accuracy for predictions of future task
duration (Roy et al., 2008). In relation,
people seem to be accurate in estimates for
tasks where frequent feedback on timing is
given (Tobin and Grondin, 2012), but not
for tasks where feedback is absent (Tobin
and Grondin, 2009; Tobin et al., 2010;
Bisson et al., 2012). In the field of software
development, predictions of for how long
a new project will take are more accurate
when data on task duration for similar
projects is utilized during predictions than
when it is not (Jørgensen, 2004a; Furulund
and Moløkken-Østvold, 2007).
While bias in predicted duration
appears to often be due to bias in mem-
ory, memory itself could be biased by
people’s motivations. However, bias in
remembered duration often appears to be
due to task characteristics such as novelty
(Boltz et al., 1998; Hinds, 1999; Roy and
Christenfeld, 2007; Tobin et al., 2010),
relative duration (Yarmey, 2000; Roy and
Christenfeld, 2008; Tobin and Grondin,
2009), size of potential estimation anchors
(Thomas and Handley, 2008), and dura-
tion since completion (Roy et al., 2008).
These tasks characteristics may alter atten-
tion that is paid to the task (Thomas and
Weaver, 1975) or memory storage size
associated with the task (Ornstein, 1969;
Block and Reed, 1978) and bias estimation.
Task characteristics cause bias in remem-
bered duration that in turn causes bias in
predicted duration. For example, actors
and observers appeared to be more influ-
enced in their estimates, for both past and
future tasks, by task characteristics, such
as overall task duration and number of
remembered task components, than they
were by being the more motivationally
involved person performing the task (Roy
et al., 2013a; see also Byram, 1997; Hinds,
1999; Jørgensen, 2004b).
The reason that memory and predic-
tion might be similarly biased is that both
might rely on a similar constructive pro-
cess with estimation based upon a gen-
eral prototypical representation for task
duration that is adjusted up or down
depending on the specifics of the situation
(Burt and Kemp, 1994; Roy et al., 2005a).
Because memory for past task duration is
often biased (see Wallace and Rabin, 1960;
Fraisse, 1963; Block and Zakay, 1997 for
reviews), the prototypical representations
that people have for many tasks, which
is the average of previous experience, is
similarly biased. A result of prototypical
memories that underestimate duration is
an expectation that tasks in the future,
such as travel plans, will take less time than
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they will in actuality (van de Ven et al.,
2011). While people frequently underesti-
mate how long tasks will take in the future,
much of this bias appears to be due to task
characteristics and not due to optimism or
motivation. This is not to say that moti-
vation never plays a role in bias; at times
people’s motivations influence their mem-
ories for past task duration (Meade, 1963;
Schwab et al., 2013) and their predictions
of future duration (Buehler et al., 1997;
Byram, 1997). However, research indicates
that bias in estimated duration frequently
exists without motivational causes.
OPTIMISM IN OTHER JUDGMENTS?
A person’s estimate of task duration is
often tied to their perceived competency at
the task. For many tasks, quicker comple-
tion is linked to high ability. Indeed, more
experience with a task is often linked to
a greater tendency to underestimate task
duration (Boltz et al., 1998; Hinds, 1999;
Roy and Christenfeld, 2007). Further, peo-
ple often appear to be overly optimistic in
their self-assessments, rating themselves as
above average on a number of skills and
personality traits (see Taylor and Brown,
1988; Chambers and Windschitl, 2004;
Dunning et al., 2004; Sedikides and Gregg,
2008, for reviews). It would seem logi-
cally impossible for the majority of people
to be above average (Taylor and Brown,
1988). However, similar to time estima-
tion, this apparent bias may be due to
people relying on prototypical representa-
tions of ability when assessing their own
abilities (Krueger, 1998; Gigerenzer, 2002;
Moore, 2007; Galesic et al., 2012; Roy et al.,
2013b). People understand that various
skills have skewed ability distributions and
their self-assessments are often related to
distribution shape: high when most are
believed to be good and low when most
are believed to be bad (Galesic et al., 2012;
Roy et al., 2013b). When the skill being
rated has a skewed distribution, a ten-
dency to rely on prototypical representa-
tions can lead to self-assessments that, on
face value, appear to indicate a belief in
the self as being falsely unique (above or
below average), but actually may indicate
a belief in the self as being prototypical
(near the mode of the distribution; Roy
et al., 2013b). Further, a reliance on pro-
totypes can also help explain why people
underestimate the likelihood that they will
experience rare events, such as getting can-
cer, and overestimate the likelihood that
they will experience common events, such
as owning a car (Chambers et al., 2003;
Kruger and Burrus, 2004).
It is also possible that other task char-
acteristics, such as how clearly defined
and specific the task is (Dunning et al.,
2004; Roy and Liersch, 2013) or howmuch
information people have about their own
ability and the ability of others (Chambers
and Windschitl, 2004), can influence self-
assessments. On a related note, peo-
ple’s overconfidence in their responses on
quizzes and tests might have more to do
with the type of questions being asked
than with actual self-confidence (see Juslin
et al., 2000 for review). While people
appear to overestimate their abilities and
performance, these biases appear to often
be due to specific aspects of the skill,
performance or event and not due to
optimism or motivation.
PROBLEMSWITH PERCEIVED
OPTIMISM
While people might not be overly opti-
mistic about how their future will unfold, a
belief in optimism as the cause of bias may
be problematic both for researchers and
for people in general. Inasmuch as biased
predictions are viewed as being caused
by optimism and that being optimistic is
viewed positively, people might not seek
out the true causes of bias and ways to
eliminate bias.
Even though people acknowledge they
are often biased in their predictions
(Buehler et al., 2002; Armor et al., 2008),
it is not clear if they know why they
are biased. In general, people are not
always able to accurately describe their
decision-making processes (e.g., Wilson
and Hodges, 1992). It appears that, like
researchers (Taylor and Brown, 1988;
Armor and Taylor, 1998, 2002; Dunning
et al., 2004), people often attribute their
errors to being overly optimistic (Armor
et al., 2008). The belief in optimism as
a cause of bias can be problematic for
two reasons: first, people might be miss-
ing the real causes of their error. To make
accurate and unbiased predictions for how
long it will take to complete a task, people
would need to realize that factors such as
task length (Roy and Christenfeld, 2008),
familiarity (Roy and Christenfeld, 2007),
and complexity (Roy et al., 2013a) biased
their memories for these tasks and correct
these memories before estimating future
task duration. Simply ascribing their error
to optimism would make them miss the
actual causes.
Second, while optimism appears to
be a popular (Christensen-Szalanski and
Beach, 1984), convenient, and more
importantly, common excuse for error,
there are few negatives to being seen as
overly optimistic. While people believe
that they are at times overly optimistic,
they actually believe that they should try
to be more optimistic (Armor et al., 2008).
They appear to be willing to deal with
what they believe are the negative conse-
quences of their optimism. To a certain
degree, they would be correct to do so
because a large number of positive out-
comes have been associated with having an
optimistic outlook (e.g., Rasmussen et al.,
2009). Because they do not mind their
self-diagnosed cause of their bias, people
will not be motivated to seek out the real
cause. Interventions aimed at decreasing
bias by decreasing optimism are likely to
be unpopular as well as misguided (Roy
et al., 2005a).
SUMMARY
People often appear to be overly optimistic
in their predictions of the future. However,
much of this apparent optimism could be
due to other processes such as an over
reliance on prototypical representations.
In the case of time estimation, people’s
representation for task duration is often
too short, causing them to underestimate
future completion times. To improve pre-
dictions, factors that bias memory need to
be taken into account and corrected. If,
instead, bias in prediction is attributed to
an optimistic outlook, then people will be
unlikely to identify and correct the true
causes of their bias. Interventions might
be better aimed at decreasing the belief in
over-optimism, not optimism itself.
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